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Abstract • The Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century faced challenges in the 
Mediterranean from domestic and above all foreign pirates that forced it to articulate its 
notions of maritime territoriality, that is, the parts of the sea over which it claimed 
imperial and legal authority. This article will examine the role of islands in defining 
that territoriality, examining several cases involving the imperial response to piracy for 
their articulation of maritime space. The most important distinction was between the 
open sea and domestic waters, which were above all delineated by the shoreline, apart 
from exceptional responses to European privateers. Consequently, it is argued that the 
place of islands in Ottoman maritime territoriality is largely littoral in nature, and that 
littoralité is an essential component of the Ottoman understanding of insularité. 
This article is an attempt to situate islands as a part of Ottoman claims of maritime 
territoriality, focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean in the eighteenth century. That is, 
I hope to show that the sorts of ways that officials of the Ottoman state wrote about 
issues of Ottoman control in certain bodies of water demonstrate that pieces of land 
denoted as islands—aḍalar or cezāyir—performed a particular role in territorial 
delineation. This role, however, was not one of a specific maritime border. Rather, 
islands acted as one distinct element of a coherent littoral frontier separating the 
Ottoman Empire from the open sea and its many dangers, and as such were thought of 
in the same way as ports and coastal fortifications. As with ports and forts, islands 
were centers of the projection of territoriality and legal authority over surrounding 
waters, even if they themselves were only loosely subject to the sultan’s authority. 
They created a space both on land and in the surrounding waters over which the 
Ottoman state claimed practical legal control. More than this, islands were one 
element of a wider littoral landscape that defined what the Ottoman Empire 
considered to be its waters in the Mediterranean, making them one incarnation of a 
particular set of spaces through which interactions with outsiders were regulated and 
imperial authority was asserted. Territoriality was therefore a central part of Ottoman 
insularity, where islands joined coastlines in forming the limits of the Ottoman state. 
Using examples of imperial commands from a wider body of over two 
hundred archival documents concerning Ottoman attempts to maintain peace and 
order in what they considered as their waters, with regard to both foreigners and their 
own subjects, I will argue that the idea of coastal protection was central to the 
Ottoman understanding of the space around their islands. Territoriality was not an 
abstract claim, but signified the ability of the Ottoman state to assert its law and 
justice over a particular maritime space that existed between the shore and the open 
sea.1 With their extensive coastlines, islands provided a particular sort of space within 
which this ability was tested, in particular by the actions of local and foreign pirates 
attacking mercantile shipping in the surrounding sea. The usual Ottoman response to 
these threats was to seek to protect the islands as a whole, land and sea, as the security 
of the maritime traffic that passed islands was equally important to the imperial duty 
of protection as was that to the islands’ inhabitants. 
Foreign Challenges and Extreme Limits 
The Ottoman state faced numerous security threats in the Mediterranean from its own 
subjects, and combating such challenges involved dispatching ships or garrisons to 
the affected areas to secure the lives and property of local inhabitants. This is 
certainly an important aspect of Ottoman maritime territoriality, and of Ottoman 
imperial authority. In 1183 (1769), the governor of Rhodes made a petition to the 
Ottoman government requesting a force of galleons to destroy the pirates, and the 
appointment of a military official to ensure safe travel in the Mediterranean. 2 
Consequently, it was commanded that, in addition to the imperial galleons already 
patrolling the Ottoman Mediterranean, the galleon Tuḥfetü'l-mülūk be sent with a full 
compliment of levends (naval military forces), and that a başbuğ (a military 
commander) be dispatched to oversee the operation.3 Such expeditions seem to have 
been a fairly regular occurrence throughout the eighteenth century, despite the effort 
and cost involved.4 In essence, it was as great an imperative that those vessels and 
officials be dispatched to restore order in the seas around Rhodes as it was for 
imperial soldiers to be sent to quell rebellion in distant land centers like Baghdad; this 
was, after all the basis for imperial authority.5 As Nicholas Vatin noted in his analysis 
of imperial control in sixteenth-century Basra, frontier territories could be ruled in 
different ways, but territories “conquered but not vassal in no way merit the title 
‘well-protected.’” 6  The one word that occurs again and again in documents 
concerning piracy and maritime matters is muḥāfaẓa; protection or defense. It was this 
ability to protect, regulate, and control that marked the coastal ṣu (water) from the 
open baḥr (sea), and, as firm features on the maritime landscape, islands were crucial 
to defining and implementing this distinction.  
Ensuring that the Well-Protected Domains remained well-protected meant not 
just tackling local pirates and brigands, but dealing with troublesome foreigners. Of 
course, this meant utilizing coastal fortifications, the imperial fleet, and corsairs to 
protect Ottoman seas and ports from assault by outright enemies, be they Venetian, 
Habsburg, or Russian. Yet, the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean also played host 
to the warships and privateers of Ottoman friends engaged in conflict throughout the 
eighteenth century. These visitors—generally British and French—were neither 
welcome, nor well-behaved, fighting under Ottoman fortresses and blockading 
harbors, not to mention causing great damage to the Ottoman economy by assaulting 
the ships used to freight goods between Ottoman ports, hitting staples such as wheat, 
coffee, and soap particularly hard. The attacks on shipping in particular posed a major 
challenge to Ottoman authority in the Eastern Mediterranean, and required firm action 
from the state. Of course, military action was not an option, as the offending parties 
were states holding ʿahdnāmes (Capitulations) from the sultan and whose subjects 
were müsteʾmin, protected foreigners. Thus, from the first major attacks in the Aegean 
in the late 1690s, which saw naval battles around Izmir and prizes taken within island 
harbors, the Ottoman state instituted what it later called the şurūt-u deryā, the sea or 
maritime regulations.7 In 1696 in order to stop these assaults, an imperial decree was 
issued forbidding armed ships of European powers to pass a line going from Andros 
to Kos and ending at Foça (near Izmir), and ruling that offending parties would be 
obliged to pay compensation for any prizes taken beyond that maritime border. This 
was reinstituted in 1703, going from the Anatolian coast to Samos, Ikaria, Andros, 
and ending at Euboea. During the greater violence of the mid-eighteenth century, 
these maritime regulations were extended and reinforced in 1744, 1758, and 1779 on 
an enlarged scale. In 1744 and 1758, the limits of the Ottoman maritime territory were 
given as from the south of Morea to the Gulf of Sirte in Libya, and in 1779 as being a 
line between the Morea, Crete, and the western border of Egypt. There is no 
explanation as to why Crete was included in the 1779 regulations, and not the earlier 
ones. Perhaps European accusations that the maritime border was “chimerical” 
necessitated a more fixed position, thus giving Crete as an island a very important role 
at this stage in defining Ottoman maritime territoriality. Regardless, these regulations, 
which are mapped in Figure 1 below, saw the Ottoman state extend its maritime 
borders out of the Aegean, cutting off the entire Eastern Mediterranean from foreign 
privateering. What is more, the Ottomans successfully enforced these new boundaries, 
securing compensation for Ottoman merchants who lost their goods on board ships 
attacked by the French and British privateers who broke the regulations.  
FIGURE 1 
Little has been written about how the Ottomans thought about the sea in a 
legal sense, yet from the orders and regulations drawn up to curb attacks by foreign 
and technically friendly privateers we can get a real sense as to the thought process 
behind Ottoman policy. One example of such an imperial command issued to 
governors and naval officials on 20 Safer 1193 (9 March 1779) was aimed at nipping 
the situation in the bud. With Britain and France once again at blows due to the war in 
North America, the privateers of those two nations returned to the Mediterranean in 
force. Following complaints by French merchant captains of attacks on their ships, the 
command was issued to bring back the regulations with a slightly modified 
geographical route, but with the same principle:  
Enmity and contention having arisen among the European states, and in 
consequence of the faithful observance of the former sea regulations being 
neglected in various ways by the ships of the said states, a line is to be imagined 
going from the realm of Morea to the island of Crete.8  
This ḥaṭṭ-ı mefrūż, the “imagined line,” marked the outer limits of Ottoman maritime 
territoriality, within which European ships could not attack each other or others. It is 
no coincidence that islands helped to form this boundary in the north, between the 
large island of Crete and the Morea, which could also, as will be seen, be referred to 
as a cezīre, an island. Islands clearly played some part in forming the Ottoman idea of 
the limits of its liquid territory.  
These regulations introduced notions about maritime space and law that 
contemporaries assumed the Ottomans to be lacking, with one notable maritime 
scholar of the early nineteenth century, Domenico Alberto Azuni, writing that he 
knew of no maritime law in the Ottoman Empire except that which had been 
introduced by the Europeans.9 It is clear that this is patently false, with the 1193/1779 
regulation making explicit reference on several occasions to an Ottoman 
understanding of ḳavāʿid-i baḥriye or ḳavāʿid-i deryā (maritime rules or rules of the 
sea), and even of ḳavāʿid-i merʿīye-i deryā (rules of respect at sea). They set territorial 
limits, stating that, in normal circumstances, British and French ships could not make 
attacks inside the ports or under or in front of the cannon of fortresses (limānları 
derūnlarında ve ḳılāʿ ṭopu altlarında ve pīşgāhında), nor within three leagues of the 
coast (sevāḥilinden). Thus, in the case of the 1193/1779 regulation, it was repeated 
violations of Ottoman ports, fortresses, and coastlines that led to the introduction of a 
blanket ban on violence in the Ottoman Mediterranean, extending the limits of 
Ottoman authority out to sea, with the aim of protecting land and maritime territory. 
The origins of this particular incarnation of the maritime limits can be found in 
the violence that plagued the Eastern Mediterranean during the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1740–48). Here, the main culprits were British privateers attacking 
French shipping carrying the goods and persons of Ottoman subjects. Such traffic was 
crucial to the internal activity of Ottoman merchants freighting goods around the 
Mediterranean, and above all in the lucrative routes between Egypt and the North 
African Regencies, and the Levant and Aegean. Mapping out the attacks that occurred 
between 1744 and 1747 reveals to what extent the islands under Ottoman control were 
areas around which this privateering violence occurred, partly because they formed 
important landmarks for commercial traffic. From the petitions made by Ottoman 
subjects to both the British embassy and the Ottoman authorities, and the commands 
issued by the Ottoman government, it is possible to track the rampages of a number of 
British ships that took French ships with Ottoman goods, with two in particular—The 
Ruby and The Fame—being the worst perpetrators. In 1744, The Ruby made at least 
four captures involving Ottoman subjects, off Kythera, Crete, Rhodes, and Zakynthos. 
In 1746 and 1747, The Fame made attacks off Crete, and along the Syrian coast and 
Cyprus. Both ships, in targeting French ships, managed to take cloth, soap, and—most 
damningly from the Ottoman perspective—much-needed shipments of rice and coffee 
being sent to Cyprus and Syria from Egypt. In both cases, the attacks centered on 
islands, in the west around Crete and the entrance to the Aegean, and in the east 
around Cyprus. In issuing maritime regulations that made the Mediterranean east of 
the imaginary line between Morea and Sirte not just a mare clausum but, in essence, 
an extension of the land in which Ottoman laws would be in full force, the Ottoman 
state was able to exert enough legal and diplomatic pressure to secure compensation 
or restitution for their wronged subjects from the British authorities, amounting to 
over 80,000 guruş.10  
The Ottoman commands issued during this period give us an excellent sense 
of the state’s understanding of its maritime space. It was at this time that the 
Europeans were first forbidden from sending armed ships beyond an imagined line 
from Mora to Sirte in Libya. A command issued to the governors and commanders in 
the Ottoman islands, as well as to Ottoman naval commanders at the end of 
Muharrem 1157 (mid-March 1744) reported complaints of the French that one of their 
ships had been taken by pirates cruising around the islands of Cephalonia and Aya 
Mavro (Lefkada), and elsewhere in “the waters of the island of Morea” (Mora cezīresi 
ṣularında).11 As Kahraman Şakul illustrates in this volume, the Morean peninsula was 
almost an island, with only a narrow joint at Corinth connecting it to the rest of 
Greece.12 By emphasizing the insular nature of the Morea, it was placed on the same 
level as both large islands like Crete and smaller ones like Lefkada. In other words, 
the recipients of the order—who comprised various ranks of Ottoman official 
throughout the Mediterranean islands—were being asked to think of all sorts of ports, 
islands, and coastal landmasses as a common frontier under threat. Thus, when the 
command spoke of forbidding European ships from coming within “a number of 
leagues” (birḳaç mīl baʿīd) of Ottoman territory in accordance with the “ancient 
regulations of the sea” (ḳāʿide-i ḳadīme-i deryā), the islands and ports (cezāyir ve 
limānlar) that had been attacked and would now be protected, formed a homogenous 
space together that defined Ottoman territorial waters proper (ṣular).  
This creation of a united insular and litoral territory helps us to understand 
what was perhaps the most important of the surviving orders from this period, issued 
at the end of Şaban 1157 (beginning of October 1744) to Ottoman governors and 
judges around the Mediterranean coast and islands.13 The opening narrative described 
the attacks by friendly foreign states against Ottoman subjects and their goods. The 
solution was, as in the earlier conflicts, to draw a line. But here, the language is quite 
different to the later decree, which, as we have seen used the term ḥaṭṭ-ı mefrūż, the 
imagined line, to describe the new maritime border. Here, something more fixed is 
described that would deter any further raids (aḳın) against Ottoman waters (Devlet-i 
ʿAliyem ṣularında), specifically commanding that “a boundary be fixed in the sea” 
(deryāda bir ḥadd taʿyin olunub). The purpose of this boundary (ḥadd) was to stop 
European ships fighting each other “in the waters of my Sublime State and in the open 
oceans, on the shores of Rumelia and Arabia [i.e. Europe and Asia]” (Devlet-i ʿAliyem 
ṣularında ve açıḳ enginlerinde ve Rūm-ili ve ʿArabistān ḳiyilerinde). This command 
makes several mentions of the protected spaces from foreign attack, such as “the 
waters of my Well-Protected Domains, under the guns of the castles, and around the 
islands” (memālik-i maḥrūsem ṣularında ve ḳalʿe ṭopu altında ve cezāyir civārında). 
Once again, we find divisions between different sorts of maritime space, separating 
the shores and territorial waters from the open sea, with islands forming a distinct part 
of this maritime frontier. Yet, all of these spaces—coastal waters, harbors, coastal 
fortresses, the waters around islands—are littoral features, and it is perhaps what 
helped to define territoriality across the maritime frontier. 
Borders and Frontiers, Solidity, and Fluidity 
Defining the physical limits of early modern empires is often a difficult and 
problematic task. It has often been the case in recent years for the terms “fluid borders” 
or “fluid frontiers” to be employed in seeking to understand what Palmira Brummett 
termed as the “large and porous” frontiers of the Sublime State.14 Describing a border 
as “fluid” is to describe it precisely as it should not be in geopolitics, that is, changing 
and changeable. Thus, the images invoked by the concept of fluidity in the borders of 
the state are perhaps problematic in their assumptions when speaking about certain 
periods. 15  An n-gram query for “fluid borders” in one major online scholarly 
repository reveals that usage of that term skyrocketed from precisely 1989. The 
implication that this was a specific reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union, and the 
idea that borders had been broken down and new opportunities for interactions had 
opened up, remains a powerful one in scholarship on that period.16 If the (re)gaining 
of fluidity could indicate the situation of post-Soviet Europe, then the loss of fluidity 
through the fixing of permanent borders following the treaty of Carlowitz and 
subsequent agreements has certainly been employed to explain changes in the nature 
of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the eighteenth century.17 If part of the 
parameters of our historical enquiry is to define the space of our subject, then the 
solidification of borders must surely be a pivotal moment.  
Yet, if we frame our notion of space in terms of states being solid or fluid, 
how do we deal with borders that actually possess those physical properties? Does a 
mountain range restrict fluidity compared to a river? Is a woodland particularly 
porous as a border?18 And then, what about the sea? Is it even possible to speak of the 
sea as having any part in defining the borders of a state? In fact, understanding 
attitudes towards the sea is crucial to understanding notions of territoriality. In his 
extended discussion of the history of international relations in East Asia, David Kang 
opened a chapter on nomads and islands with the assertion that “the difference 
between a border and a frontier is the difference between a line and a space.”19 For 
Kang, a border was a fixed dividing line between two polities, whereas a frontier 
represented a state of political fluidity, which could be turned solid through the 
expansion of fixed authority into the area. The term “frontier,” however, has its own 
problems, not least when thinking about Ottoman history with its connotations of 
perpetual warfare and lack of imperial control.20 To briefly reclaim the term for the 
purposes of this paper may well prove problematic, but it deserves some consideration, 
based on the work of Hugh Clark on ideas of the frontier in Chinese history, in which 
he defined the frontier as a space of cultural division.21 In his discussion on frontier 
discourse, Clark gave a most eloquent articulation of the sea as a border: 
For all its mystery, however, the maritime frontier was real, and the reality of 
this frontier was different from that of land frontiers. Because at first glance 
they are so precisely demarcated, they are both a frontier and a boundary. They 
appear to offer no abstraction. When one reaches the shore, that is the boundary, 
and the boundary is the frontier. There is no immediate “other side.” What is 
there is the empty ocean. Thus the maritime frontier appears to be unlike any 
land frontier; where the latter are imprecise, the maritime frontier presents a 
frontier that is very clearly defined.22 
This, in Clark’s argument, gave a maritime frontier a very particular set of properties. 
If a land frontier was a place of cultural mingling, then the maritime frontier was an 
“interface,” a space where two cultures could meet, but where the interaction could be 
controlled and regulated. From this, we have an intriguing framework within which to 
think about the sea as a means of defining territoriality: a clear border at the shore; 
and a means by which to regulate interactions with others.  
Thinking about the Ottoman case, and islands in particular, requires re-
working this framework somewhat. The idea of the interface is useful, as the maritime 
frontier was a place that housed the docks, customs houses, and defense networks that 
marked that space as Ottoman. However, in the Ottoman understanding of 
territoriality—as with many others in Europe at the same time—the shore and its 
institutions did not form the border in itself, but were a marker for the actual limits of 
territorial authority, the territorial waters that occupied the space between the shore 
and the sea. That is, the borders of the Ottoman Empire in this case were quite 
literally fluid. Placing islands within this framework complicates the assumption of 
the idea of interface in this regard. Islands, of course, are pieces of land entirely 
surrounded by the sea; this is, as Michel Fontenay reminded us, what makes islands 
specifically different from other sorts of land.23  
This definition renders islands as distinctly littoral entities. The shores of the 
islands cannot be separated from their waters nor their hinterland, defined as much by 
their liquidity as by their solid state. Histories of coasts and littoral spaces have started 
to make important contributions to conceptual notions of maritime space in general, 
and the engagement of scholars such as Isaac Land and David Worthington in 
developing the field has led to interesting collaborative work.24 One of the questions 
that Land raises in his writing is the utility of coastal history as a sub-field, and in a 
review essay from 2007 he provides a compelling and rather beautiful argument in its 
favor: 
“Oceanic” history was always a metaphor: how many historians ever wrote 
about salt water? Coastal history is a more productive, and instructive, metaphor. 
Coastlines would not exist without their proximity to the ocean, but their 
character is not determined solely by the ocean’s action. Coasts may form 
bulwarks of resistance to the waves, as in the case of coral reefs or towering 
cliffs. Yet there are messy, intermediate places like tidal flats and brackish 
estuaries. There are also quite coves and inlets, connected to the ocean but only 
gently shaped by it. […] In their diversity, and in their ever changing nature, 
coasts parallel the diverse experiences of human beings in their confrontation 
with water, and each other.25 
The variety and diversity of the coastline, its permanence and transience, is an 
important factor in accounting for and interpreting its role in human politics and 
society. The transience of permanence is an important idea, one which the geographer 
David Harvey defines as a perpetually perishing space dependent on processes, 
usually capital flows.26 The relationship between coastal space and human is therefore 
contingent, and translates the space beyond a mere border between the blue ocean and 
the green grass beyond. John Gillis has argued for a complication in our 
understanding of littoral spaces, borrowing an ecological term to describe the coast as 
an ecotone, where “land and water constitute and ecological continuum.”27 In thinking 
about coasts not as forming a border between land and sea, but as a discrete space in 
which the two are merged into something distinct, then the character of islands 
becomes rather interesting, particularly in terms of their territoriality.  
As points of land surrounded by sea, one way of thinking about islands is as 
nodes of territoriality, extending the authority of the state out into the open sea. This 
is achieved, in part, through their ecotonal nature, merging and forging a new space 
from water and land. In this sense, the Ottoman imperial commands that we often find 
islands and territorial waters together almost as synonyms, an demonstration perhaps 
of the deep significance of what Gillis calls “brown water history”.28 In a command to 
the Kapudan-ı Derya in 1758, representative of a number of similar commands issued 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, the admiral was instructed to patrol 
“around the islands and other waters of my Sublime State” (aḍalar aralarında ve sāʾir 
devlet-i ʿaliyem ṣularında).29 The spatial implication here is that islands are a distinct 
but connected part of Ottoman territorial waters. What, then, of archipelagos or other 
clusters of islands? For instance, in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is a lone island 
between Anatolia and the Levant surrounded by hundreds of miles of open sea. Crete, 
however, sits at the entrance to the Aegean, which is broken up by dozens of islands, 
each one acting as a small node of imperial authority in their surrounding waters, 
assisted by what Cyprian Broodbank has termed “a high degree of inter-visibility.”30 
Does this intensification of territoriality through the presence of many islands then 
indicate a stronger Ottoman claim to territorial authority in the Aegean than it could 
make in the Levant? In other words, how far did Ottoman maritime territoriality 
depend on islands separating Ottoman waters from the sea beyond? 
Sultan of the Two Seas? 
From examining a number of imperial commands concerning piracy and maritime 
violence in the Mediterranean Sea in the seventeenth and eighteenth century from the 
perspective of the Ottoman state in Istanbul, it seems that the sea was divided into two 
parts. The first was rūy-u deryā, literally “the face of the sea.” This term was used to 
describe the open sea, the waters considered outside of direct imperial control. To 
give an example, at the beginning of Rebiülevvel 1122 (beginning of May 1710), a 
command was issued to İbrahim Pasha, one of the Ottoman galleon commanders in 
the Mediterranean.31 It reported that on 11 Muharrem of that year (March 12, 1710) a 
pirate galleon and two saitees appeared from the open sea (rūy-u deryā…ẓuhūr), and 
began targeting shipping between the Egyptian commercial hub of Damietta and the 
Syrian ports such as Sidon, Tripoli, and Payas. The Ottoman solution was to send two 
galleons under the command of İbrahim Pasha to patrol between Payas and the straits 
of Damietta, and this was really all they could do to pursue their aim of protecting 
Muslim ships from pirate attacks (müslümān sefinelerini ḳorsan eşḳiyası mużırrından 
emin ve sālim eydüb). The open sea between Egypt and Syria was just that; open, 
featureless, ungovernable. The language used in this report, that the pirates appeared 
or emerged (ẓuhūr) from out of this vast expanse, perhaps gives a sense of how this 
space was perceived. These ships were only comprehensible when sighted, and more 
often than not such an encounter would happen in or around coastal waters rather than 
in the open sea, as projections of power and control emanated from the coastal 
defenses and ports.32 
Mounting these defense operations was an essential duty, as the claim to 
territory, both rhetorically and practically, was crucial to the legitimation of the 
Ottoman state. Among the various grandiose titles claimed by the House of Osman, 
one of the more frequently employed phrases in monumental epigraphy and 
diplomatic correspondence was sulṭānü'l-berreyn ve ḫaḳānü'l-baḥreyn, the Sultan of 
the two lands and ruler of the two seas. Histories of the Ottoman Empire have focused 
extensively on the first element of this title, exploring the theories, methods, successes, 
and problems of the assertion of Istanbul’s authority over the urban and rural space of 
the imperial dominions in Europe and Asia. Indeed, much of our understanding of 
what made the Ottoman Empire what it was has been shaped by its great landmass. 
However, great strides have certainly been made in understanding the Ottoman 
relationship to the sea, upon which the assertions of this present study are entirely 
dependent.33 The second part of that grand imperial title is crucial in developing our 
understanding Ottoman state and society, its place in the world, and its self-image. As 
well as claiming its two great seas—the Black and the White (the Mediterranean)—
rhetorically, at various different times the Ottoman state also attempted to exert 
various levels of imperial control over them. Beyond this, we need to consider 
imperial influence in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, not to 
mention the innumerable bodies of water inland, the rivers, and lakes. Moreover, with 
so much of the population of the Ottoman Empire being riverine, lacustrine, or littoral, 
and with the sea playing such a central role in trade and travel, we simply must 
consider the Ottoman relationship with liquid space in order to fully appreciate the 
nature of imperial authority.  
One of the reasons, I suspect, that the sea is often passed over in analyzing the 
Ottomans as an Empire, is because it is difficult to envisage authority over something 
that is, quite literally, intangible. Unlike rivers and other inland bodies of water, the 
open sea, as the early modern European theorists of international law posited, cannot 
be so easily physically occupied.34 A warship can only control a limited part of a vast 
and ever-shifting expanse, and then only temporarily, dependent on finite supplies and 
fickle weather. Maritime powers could use their naval might to project such control 
over sea-lanes, but these lanes were not physical highways, but ill-defined and 
temporary passages from one landmass to another, the very essence of Harvey’s 
permanences. Perhaps the only analogous space to that of the abstract sea in terms of 
imperial authority is the abstract desert, which is also a large and largely featureless 
space, with human habitation temporary or transitory. Taking this analogy further, we 
might begin to think about the old cliché of oases being islands of life in the desert, 
and consider islands to be oases of the sea, without which control would be 
impossible. Yet, did the Ottoman claim of maritime sovereignty and territoriality rest 
on authority over the islands in the seas it sought to control? Was Ottoman maritime 
territoriality, in effect, insular? 
This leads me to the parts of the Mediterranean immediately adjacent to 
Ottoman shores that formed the second element of that sea, generally referred to 
simply as ṣular, the Ottoman “waters.” These were controllable and crucial, the 
waters extending “birḳaç mīl,” a certain number of miles (usually up to three) from 
the shore mentioned in maritime regulations. Over half a century after the attacks on 
the Egypt-Syria shipping, a command was given in the middle of Şeval 1179 (end of 
March 1766) to the Kapudan-ı Derya Hüseyin Pasha concerning the security of trade 
in the Mediterranean.35 The order complained of the banditry of pirates (eşkiya-yı 
ḳorṣan) in attacking merchants and protected foreigners (tüccār ve müsteʾmīn 
ṭāʾifesiniñ), who were going to Egypt and travelling in the “waters of my Well-
Protected Domains in the Mediterranean Sea” (baḥr-ı sefīdiñ memālik-i maḥrūsem 
ṣularında). The complaints had been made by the governors and commanders resident 
in the islands and on the coasts (cezāyir ve sevāḥilde), who were evidently concerned 
at the effect this maritime violence would have on their territories. What was 
important in this case was that the violence on this occasion was happening in and 
around coastal and island waters, and not the open sea. The Ottoman solution was to 
dispatch the imperial fleet that summer to Morea, “around the islands and the other 
waters of my Sublime State” (aḍalar aralarında ve sāʾir devlet-i ʿaliyem ṣularında). 
Here, in a verbatim repetition of the command of 1758, the islands form a particular 
element of the maritime landscape, a specific part of the “waters” under Ottoman 
control, not separate legally or territorially, but important practically as markers for 
defining liquid imperial authority, an ecotone of territoriality and maritoriality. Yet it 
is, as the command also tells us, it was the cezīreler sāḥilleri, the coasts of the islands, 
and the populations living there, that made their protection so important, and we 
might also see those coasts as providing the islands’ ecotonality. 
Given the importance of islands in defining these territorial waters, we should 
not discount the relationship between Ottoman maritime territoriality and insularity 
per se.  To consider one extreme that largely removes islands from the equation, the 
maritime border imposed by the line drawn between Greece and Libya, intended to 
block the Eastern Mediterranean in its entirety was a successful assertion of maritime 
authority when the violence of European allies proved a significant security challenge 
and a profound threat to Ottoman shipping. This demonstrates, quite conclusively, 
that in the eighteenth century the Ottomans refused to be passive observers of 
violence in their claimed waters, and were capable of dealing with these threats (when 
posed by nominal allies) without recourse to violence themselves. In her pioneering 
study on the Ottoman sixteenth century, Palmira Brummett demonstrated that 
imperial space was relative: it could be practical through the collection of taxes or 
levying of troops; rhetorical, in that there was no guarantee that authority in a 
particular region would be respected; or imagined as a means to intimidate 
opponents. 36  Based on this, we could well say that the Ottoman maritime lines 
comprised a bit of all three categories. They created a maritime space that was largely 
imagined because of a lack of ability to physically control or divide the sea, employed 
the maritime regulations as a rhetorical device to dissuade foreign warships from 
making attacks, but ultimately that was practical because of the successful 
prosecutions made against foreign privateers. In other words, Ottoman maritime 
territoriality in the Mediterranean was not necessarily as abstract as the boast “Sultan 
of the two seas” sulṭānü'l-baḥreyn initially suggests.  
These limits were, however, also entirely divorced from the island and littoral 
landscape. As with many pieces of historical evidence, we only find out about 
Ottoman attitudes towards their maritime space when things went wrong. The 
maritime limits were a temporary measure. The imagined line was a legal ploy for a 
specific and challenging context, not a permanent assertion of Ottoman legal authority 
over the entire sea; once the trouble abated, the regulations were discarded until the 
next conflict. As such, the maritime limits, whether they were fixed or imagined, lines 
or borders, were not comparable to the fixing of land borders in the same period. 
Ultimately, the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century was not interested in asserting 
a universalist claim over the Mediterranean. The rūy-u deryā or açıḳ engin—the open 
sea—remained a non-territorial space. When imperial commands do refer to açıḳlar, 
open waters, in the context of territorial waters, this refers almost exclusively to the 
maintenance of shipping lanes. Therefore, to consider maritime territoriality aside 
from this extreme regulation, we need to return to a more literal landscape. 
That the fixing of land borders and the articulation of maritime space occurred 
in the same period is not a coincidence. The processes, however, were entirely 
different; this might be a trite statement, but it is necessary to articulate these 
differences.37  The Ottoman archives are full of little sketches, maps, and textual 
descriptions of border commissions and negotiations. To take one example, after the 
Treaty of Sistova (1791) it was necessary to settle the route of the Ottoman-Habsburg 
border. One of the few places transferred from the Ottomans to the Habsburgs was a 
parcel of land in between the Una and Glina rivers (today the northwest border 
between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). A standard map was drawn up as per the 
treaty to show the new frontier; it provides a number of features used to define the 
border, including rivers, streams, mountains, villages, and castles.38 In this case, a line 
could be drawn on a map, agreed by both parties, marked by set features, and 
henceforth it would be understood that on one side of the line was Habsburg territory, 
and that on the other was Ottoman. Thus, when foreign merchants crossed into the 
Ottoman Empire by land, there was, at least on a geopolitical level, a moment when 
they could say for certain that they had set foot upon Ottoman territory.  
The processes of defining the Ottoman land borders occurred largely in the 
context of treaty negotiations with belligerent neighbors, something that cannot be 
said for territorial waters in the Mediterranean. However, for merchants coming by 
sea, there was also such a moment when they could be said to have reached Ottoman 
territory at sea. On first consideration, it might appear that their experience of being in 
Ottoman territory, enjoying their freedoms as müsteʾmin and becoming subject to the 
consequent financial and legal regime, began only on their arrival in port. From 
another perspective, it could be understood that islands formed natural physical 
boundaries marking the start of Ottoman waters, at least in the minds of these 
historical actors. Passing Kythera, Crete, or Rhodes would take merchants into a sea 
bounded by Ottoman territory on all sides and filled with Ottoman islands. Perhaps, 
then, the Aegean islands could be understood as equivalent to forests or rivers on land 
in marking Ottoman territory. This, however, does not seem to be the Ottoman 
understanding of their territoriality as expressed in the documents I have examined: 
after all, as a number of the commands demonstrated, they considered their authority 
to stretch just beyond the coast, a number of leagues—birḳaç mīl—out into the sea. 
The part of the sea that required protection was the ṣu, the territorial waters, and 
violations there called for action from the state. There was, therefore, a tangible 
moment when a ship came into the Ottoman Empire’s territory on the water and was 
entitled to receive Ottoman protection, and the coasts of both islands and the main 
landmasses helped to define this, not least because of the authority they projected 
through their nature as concurrently liquid and solid space. 
Conclusions 
Was there something particular about the place of islands in Ottoman territoriality? 
Gilles Veinstein said that in studying Ottoman insularity, we are attempting “to 
discern what specific place and role this state reserved to its possessions of a certain 
kind that distinguishes them from all its other provinces, themselves diverse in 
nature.”39  Does the Ottoman approach to maritime territoriality in the eighteenth 
century distinguish islands from other spaces, such as coasts, castles, or ports? I 
would argue, in this case, that this was a territoriality defined by things littoral rather 
than particularly insular. Islands were a crucial part of defining this liquid territory, 
but this did not make the Ottoman claim to the Aegean all encompassing; in terms of 
territory, it was not an Ottoman lake, nor an engorged river populated by islets. Just a 
few leagues beyond an island’s shores, territorial waters became open sea once again, 
outside of imperial control and legal authority. However, whilst the maritory of the 
Aegean islands was defined by their coastal waters and not simply by virtue of their 
being in the Aegean, their role in defining space within that open sea was crucial. 
Most importantly of all, that definition of space had a purpose beyond the 
bluster of official rhetoric. If we return to one of the cases examined earlier, that of 
the Ottoman attempt to stop pirate attacks between Syria and Egypt in 1710, we can 
see the rationale behind claims of maritime territoriality and their articulation. In 
justifying the deployment of the imperial fleet in force—with galleons, galleys, and 
frigates—to patrol the open waters between Damietta and Payas as we saw above, the 
command explained that it was aimed at securing justice for “the poor subjects and 
people of the realm residing on the coasts of all the isles and islands” (bilcümle aḍalar 
ve cezāyir sāḥilinin sākin olan fuḳarā-yı raʿiyyet ve ehl-i memleketiñ).40 More than 
this, it detailed that “the merchant galleons coming to Egypt and other major cities, 
the small and large caïques travelling among the islands, and the ships of the 
protected foreigners in the waters of my Sublime State, are [to receive] the endeavor 
and exertion of protection and security from the snares and damages of pirates.”41 As 
Gillis reminds us, coasts are where the majority of fishing and shipping takes place, 
where populations benefit from the rich ecological systems produced by the shore’s 
ecotone.42 This is where the spatial distinctions that defined the Ottoman maritime 
territory make some sense; in order to secure Ottoman waters, temporary assertions 
over the sea were occasionally necessary, all with the aim of protecting the people 
living on the coasts in Europe, Asia, and the islands, as well as those trading or sailing 
in what the Ottomans considered to be their waters, more often than not centered on 
the coast..  
As has been demonstrated in the responses to both domestic and foreign 
pirates, these waters were clearly defined, and the Ottoman state was able to use both 
force and legal measures to assert its authority. However, for the most part, with the 
exception of the maritime regulations, Ottoman claims over the sea were not total, but 
relied on specific features, especially ports and forts. 43  Islands were different in 
providing clear landmarks in the open sea for Ottoman control, and bases for the 
exertion of that control. However, maritime territoriality was not defined by insularité, 
but rather by littoralité; the coasts of an island, and coasts in general, defined what 
separated ṣu from baḥr, making Crete no different in that sense from Anatolia. What 
is important in considering Ottoman insularities based on the state’s attempt to define 
and enforce its rule against pirates and other maritime violence is therefore to think 
about islands as coastal entities with their own territorial waters. Further investigation 
needs to be done into Ottoman notions of authority at sea across time and space. 
However, it seems reasonable to conclude from this brief study that islands as a group 
did not provide a maritime border defining the limits of Ottoman control by virtue of 
being islands, but rather the coasts of each island projected its own maritime territory 
out to sea, for which liquid space the Ottoman state was responsible for ensuring 
security and peace, much as it was on land. 
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